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NOTES
CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE BARRING ACTION OF UNLICENSED
CONTRACTOR
In the recent California case of Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons1 the Su-
preme Court of California decided that when an unlicensed subcontractor performs
services for a general contractor and the general contractor receives payment for
the work, the subcontractor cannot maintain any action against him to recover
compensation for his services.
The essential facts in the case were as follows: plaintiffs George W. Lewis and
Paul C. Queen were engaged in the contracting business as the partnership of Lewis
and Queen. Lewis had an individual license but neither Queen nor the partnership
of Lewis and Queen had licenses as required by sections 70282 and 70293 of the
Business and Professions Code. Defendant Ball Sons was also a partnership
engaged in the business of general contracting. In June, 1949, defendant was
awarded two contracts by the state for the construction of a section of the Holly-
wood Parkway. Defendant then entered into contracts with the plaintiff whereby
the latter would perform part of the work and rent equipment to the defendant.
After performance of the contracts the plaintiff brought an action against the
defendant for damages for breach of equipment rental agreements and for the
reasonable value of equipment alleged to have been held beyond the agreed rental
term.
The Supreme Court, in applying the general rule that courts will not aid in the
enforcement of an illegal contract, upheld the trial court's ruling that section 70314
of the Business and Professions Code barred plaintiff's action. The court stated:5
The reason for this refusal is not that the courts are unaware of possible injustice be-
tween the parties, and that the defendant may be left in possession of some benefit he
should in good conscience turn over to the plaintiff, but that this consideration is out-
weighed by the importance of deterring illegal conduct.
148 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
2CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7028:
"Engaging in business without a license. It is unlawful for any person to engage in the
business or act in the capacity of a contractor within this State without having a license there-
fore, unless such person is particularly exempted from the provisions of this chapter."
3 CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7029:
"Acting in joint venture or combination without additional license therefor. It is unlawful
for any two or more licensees, each of whom has been issued a license to engage separately in
the business or to act separately in the capacity of a contractor within this State without first
having secured an additional license for action in the capacity of such a joint venture or com-
bination in accordance with the provision of this chapter as provided for an individual, co-
partnership or corporation."
4 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031:
"Allegation and proof of license in action on contract. No person engaged in the business
or acting in the capacity of a contractor may bring or maintain any action in any court of this
State for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract for which
a license is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly licensed
contractor at all times during the performance of such act or contract."
r 48 Cal. 2d at 150, 308 P.2d at 719.
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In support of the above rule, the court cited as precedents a number of cases 6
which seem to be distinguishable on their facts. The court continued:7
In each such case, how the aims of policy can best be achieved depends on the kind of
illegality and the particular facts involved. [Citations omitted.] But we are not free
to weigh these considerations in the present case.
The court went on to say that section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code
precluded them from weighing the aforesaid considerations, and applied section
7031 literally.
However, the court was by no means bound to interpret section 7031 so as to
bar plaintiff's action. In fact, the California courts no longer interpret that statute
so as to "leave the defendant in possession of some benefit he should in good con-
science turn over to the plaintiff."
In Norwood v. Judd,8 plaintiff and defendant had formed a partnership to
conduct a contracting business. Defendant was a duly licensed contractor. How-
ever, neither the plaintiff nor the partnership had a license. The plaintiff brought
an action to recover his share of the business proceeds from his partner. Recovery
was allowed, the court declaring: 9
It must be remembered that these licensing statutes are passed primarily for the protec-
tion and safety of the public. They are not passed for the benefit of a greedy partner
who seeks to keep for himself all of the fruits of the partnership enterprise to the
exclusion of another partner entitled to share therein. Where the illegal transaction has
been terminated, public policy is not protected or served by denying one partner relief
against another.
In the Lewis & Queen case the court attempts to distinguish the Norwood case
on the ground that that case involved one partner suing another partner. Also that
since the enterprise was not an illegal one as such but only for want of a license,
and since the defendant was not a third person for whose protection the statute had
primarily been passed, the plaintiff could recover. There the court recognized an
exception to section 7031 for the purpose of attaining a just result. Why then
should the court in the instant case not read an obvious exception in the statute
to avoid that which the court itself admittedly considers to be an unjust result?
Another case in which the statute was not applied so as to bar a recovery was
Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc.10 There an action was brought by two part-
ners against a third person to recover for carpentry work. The defense was that
the partnership was unlicensed, although Gatti and his partner, Moore, each held
6 Takeuchi v. Schmuck, 206 Cal. 782, 276 Pac. 345 (1929) (plaintiff sought to recover down
payment he made on behalf of his father, an alien-conspiracy to violate Alien Land Law);
May v. Herron, 127 Cal. App.2d 707, 274 P.2d 484 (1954) (plaintiff contractor advised de-
fendants he would build them a house if they could get a relative, who was a veteran, to secure
a government permit to do so-conspiracy to violate Federal Priorities Regulation No. 33);
Orlinoff v. Campbell, 91 Cal. App. 2d 382, 205 P.2d 67 (1949) (court said statute prohibiting
unlicensed carrier from suing intended to bring highway carriers under jurisdiction of P.U.C.
and not to protect against possible dishonesty or incompetence) ; Wise v. Raddis, 74 Cal. App.
765, 242 Pac. 90 (1925) (suit by one unlicensed partner against another to recover his share of
commission-not allowed). This case was overruled by Denning v. Taber, 70 Cal. App. 2d 253,
160 P.2d 900 (1945).
7 48 Cal. 2d at 151, 308 P.2d at 719.
893 Cal. App. 2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949).
9 Id. at 286, 209 P.2d at 30.
10 27 Cal. 2d 687, 166 P.2d 265 (1946).
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individual licenses as contractors. Gatti contracted individually with the defendant
to do the work involved. Later, Gatti and Moore entered into a partnership. De-
fendant agreed that the partnership could complete the work. No partnership
license was ever secured. Recovery was allowed. The court pointed out that the
Contractors Licensing Law was passed for the safety and protection of the public,
and that such a law should not be used as a "shield for the avoidance of a just
obligation."' '
Another exception to the general rule of granting no relief to an unlicensed con-
tractor is found in those cases holding that an unlicensed person is not precluded
from recovery if he had a license at the time the contract and the cause of action
arose, although at the time the contract was executed -he was unlicensed.' 2
Where the action is between the contracting parties and the rights of third
parties are not involved, California has recognized another exception to the gen-
eral rule. It arises where the business engaged in is a lawful one and not against
public policy, but the parties fail to secure a required license. If the cause of action
is or can be based on a new promise arising out of the executed partnership agree-
ment, rather than directly on the partnership agreement, relief will not be denied
a party to a partnership contract against his partner. The leading case on this point
is Denning v. Taber.la Here it was held that when the illegal transaction has been
consummated and the proceeds for performance of the contract have been received,
then the court is not asked to enforce a new and implied promise to deliver the
proceeds to one who in good conscience is entitled to them. The court said:14
The plaintiffs do not require the aid of any illegal transaction to establish their case.
It is enough that the defendants have in hand a thing of value that belongs to them.
Some of the authorities show that, though an illegal contract will not be executed, yet,
when it has been executed by the parties themselves, and the illegal object of it has
been accomplished, the money or thing which was the price of it may be legal consid-
eration between the parties for a promise, express or implied, and the Court will not
unravel the transaction to discover its origin.
In all of the above cases a literal interpretation of the applicable statute would
have barred recovery. There are other similar decisions.15 These cases have been
on the books for years and the legislature should be cognizant of the fact that they
are not a literal interpretation of section 7031. Since the legislature has not seen
fit to amend the statute so as to have the courts interpret it literally, it could be
assumed that the legislature intended deviations from the express dictates of the
statute in order to reach an equitable result. Thus there seems to be no valid reason
to extend the application of section 7031 beyond the legislature's obvious intent.
This section should be construed and applied so as to accomplish its purpose of
protecting the public from dealings with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.
21 Id. at 690, 166 P.2d at 266.
1 2 Fewel & Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt, 17 Cal. 2d 85, 109 P.2d 650 (1941) ; Brenneman v. Lane,
87 Cal. App. 414, 262 Pac. 400 (1927); Radich v. Cermokus, 65 Cal. App. 452, 224 Pac. 124
(1924) ; Houston v. Williams, 53 Cal. App. 267, 200 Pac. 55 (1921).
13 70 Cal. App. 2d 253, 160 P.2d 900 (1945) (hearing was denied by the California Supreme
Court without a single dissenting vote).
14 Id. at 258, 160 P.2d at 902, quoting Planter's Bank v. Union Bank, 83 U.S. 483, 500
(1872).
15 Machett v. Gould, 131 Cal. App. 2d 821, 281 P.2d 524 (1955) ; Wold v. Luigi Consentino
& Sons, 109 Cal. App. 2d 854, 241 P.2d 1032 (1952); Galich v. Brkich, 103 Cal. App. 2d 187,
229 P.2d 89 (1951) ; Citizen's State Bank v. Gentry, 20 Cal.App.2d 415, 67 P.2d 364 (1937).
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In denying recovery in the Lewis & Queen case, the court arbitrarily deter-
mined that the defendant fell within the class to be protected by the statute. As
pointed out in a dissenting opinion by Justice Carter, 16 the majority of the court
seemed to reason backwards, i.e., that because the plaintiff was within the statu-
tory definition (subcontractor) he could not recover, instead of reasoning that be-
cause the defendant was not within the class to be protected, the defendant could
not set up the statute as a bar.
By applying a literal interpretation of section 7031 as it did, the court allows a
windfall to the defendant and imposes an unconscionable forfeiture on the plaintiff.
There is a clear distinction between an agreement to operate an illegal enter-
prise, such as the business of prostitution or gambling, and the mere conducting of
a legal business without the license required by law.17 Here the transaction was
not one malum in se; there was nothing inherently illegal about the contract.
Where a large contract is involved it is very possible that the defendant will be
enriched not only at the plaintiff's expense, but also at the expense of plaintiff's
creditors. They may have to take what they can get in a bankruptcy proceeding.
The penalty does not seem to be commensurate with the offense.' 5
Section 7120 of the Business and Professions Code provides that a contractor
who wilfully or deliberately refuses to pay money due to one who provides him
with materials or services is subject to disciplinary action. Though section 7031
bars plaintiff's cause of action, there is none the less an obligation owed to the
plaintiff. It is the statute which precludes plaintiff from enforcing his right. Sec-
tion 7031 is similar to the type statute of limitations which does not extinguish the
plaintiff's cause of action but rather bars his remedy.
The court said in Hollywood Wholesale Electric Co. v. John Baskin,19
[Section] 7120 state[s] the grounds for disciplinary action against a contractor or sub-
contractor . . . who wilfully or deliberately fails to pay any moneys when due for
materials or services rendered in connection with his operation as a contractor.
In Beach v. Contractors State License Board,20 failure by a contractor to make
payment to a subcontractor in accordance with section 7120 was one of the reasons
the contractor's license was revoked. It would appear inconsistent that the legis-
lature intended to give the defendant a bar to an action against him with one hand
and make him amenable to disciplinary action for nonpayment with the other.
Since section 7031 was enacted to benefit the public and protect them against
unscrupulous contractors, the court should interpret the statute so as to benefit
the public and not to allow a windfall to one who in good conscience should com-
pensate another for the consideration he has given. In allowing one in the defend-
ant's position in the Lewis & Queen case to use the statute as a bar, a greater
segment of the public, such as the plaintiff's creditors, is more likely to be injured
than benefited.
James A. Brennan
16 48 Cal. 2d at 158, 308 P.2d at 724. Justice Schauer concurred.
17Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal.App.2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949) ; 12 CAL. JuR. 2d, Contracts
§ 74 (1953).
18 For a comprehensive discussion of the law regarding illegal contracts, see Wigmore,
A Summary of Quasi Contracts, 25 Am. L. Rav. 695 (1891) ; Notes, 40 VA. L. Rav. 1063 (1954),
27 CAiFx. L. REv. 601 (1938-39), 23 CoLum. L. REv. 665 (1923), 26 HARv. L. REv. 738 (1913).
See also Wade, Benefits Obtained under Illegal Transactions-Reasons For and Against Allow-
ing Restitution, 25 TExAs L. REv. 31 (1946).
19 121 Cal. App. 2d 415, 430, 263 P.2d 665, 675 (1953).
20 151 Cal. App. 2d 117, 311 P.2d 51 (1957).
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INSURANCE: REcovERY FOR DEATH BY "ACCIDENTAL MEANS" WHEN DISEASE
AND ACCIDENT COMMnEnE TO CAUSE DEATH.
In the case of Underwriters at Lloyd's London, England v. Lyons,' the insured
who had a fatigued heart died shortly after accidentally discharging his shotgun in
such a way as to cause one pellet to be lodged under the skin of his face. The issue
was whether the insured's death was caused by accidental means solely and inde-
pendently of any other cause. On conflicting medical testimony, the jury found
death was caused solely by accidental means. The decision was affirmed on the
principle that a fatigued heart is a dormant abnormality, and not a cause of death
when an accident lowers resistance and permits the dormant condition to disable
the insured. Though the insured might not have died if it had not been for a
fatigued heart, the court allowed recovery. The minor accidental shotgun wound
was then determined to be the sole and independent cause of death-the "acci-
dental means."
A major problem in the field of accident insurance has been whether to allow
recovery when disease and accident have combined to produce disability or death.
The decisions are not easy to reconcile, because some courts have distinguished be-
tween accidental means and accidental result.k 2 The distinction is made because
accident insurance policies generally insure against death caused solely by acci-
dental means. Courts which have recognized and applied the distinction between
accidental means and accidental result have denied recovery when a serious and un-
expected injury resulted from means which were not accidental.3 In the Lyons
case this problem was not directly involved as admittedly the gun was discharged
unexpectedly; therefore by accidental means. But an understanding of the dis-
tinction and whether or not it should be made is necessary to an understanding of
cases in the field.
In the case of Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.,4 the deceased,
in apparent good health, while playing golf was suddenly and unexpectedly over-
come from the force of the sun's rays and died shortly afterwards. The policy in-
sured against death caused solely by "accidental means." The court distinguished
accidental result from accidental means, saying that the death was of an accidental
nature; but as the policy insured against death caused by accidental means, and
since there was nothing in the chain of causation which could properly be termed
accidental or unexpected, recovery must be denied. Chief Justice Cardozo stated in
dissent: "The attempted distinction between accidental results and accidental
means will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog."5 Chief Justice
Cardozo also stated that the words of accident insurance policies must be inter-
preted in the light of the understanding and usage of the average man.
The distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental result"8 is techni-
cal, and the average insured would be unlikely to make the distinction. If he did so,
he would probably hesitate before entering into an insurance contract containing
the term "accidental means." Webster defines "accident" as an event that proceeds
from an unknown cause and is therefore not expected. 7 An accident, then, occurs
1248 F.2d 149 (1957).
2 VAMcF, INstrAN=c 957 (3d ed. 1951).
3 Landress v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934).
4Ibid.
5 Id. at 499.
6Id. at 500.
7 WxBsaTl, Naw COIIxm DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1956).
Aug., 1958] NOTES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
when either the means or result is unexpected, unforeseen, or proceeds from an
unknown cause. The courts, in the more recent decisions, have recognized no dis-
tinction between accidental "means" and "result." 8 If the phrase "due solely to
accidental means" were interpreted literally and strictly, it is probable that no
insured could recover because body infirmity or degeneration is frequently present
as a contributing factor.
In Lewis v. Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp.,9 a young man in good health
had a pimple on his lip. He apparently punctured the pimple with an instrument
causing inflammation of the brain and death. Recovery was allowed although the
means, i.e., the act of puncturing the pimple, was intentional. The court observed:
"The average man would say that the dire result so tragically out of proportion to
its trivial cause was something unforeseen, unexpected, extraordinary, an unlooked
for mishap, and so an accident."' 0 Though an intentional act results in death, re-
covery is generally allowed where the intended act is done in a manner not in-
tended," or when the death results from a substance or instrumentality, the pres-
ence or nature of which is not known, as when one drinks poison by mistake. Re-
covery should be allowed when the result is not the natural and probable result of
the act because the insured should not be held accountable for the unexpected re-
sults.
Recovery should be denied, as it was in Railway Mail Association v. Stauffer,'2
where an everyday act involving ordinary exertion brings death to an insured be-
cause he is a sufferer of heart disease. The average man would say that no accident
had occurred.
Accident insurers have insured against death or disability caused "solely" by
"accidental means" and "independently of all other causes." In addition, they
sometimes specifically exclude coverage for death or disability "caused in whole or
in part by disease." There are many cases involving the construction to be placed
on accident insurance policies containing this and language of similar import; but
the decisions are not uniform. The terms disease and infirmity in accident insur-
ance policies are generally construed liberally in favor of the insured and refer
only to diseases or infirmities of a somewhat serious or chronic nature.13
The courts agree that if the insured was free from disease before the accident
occurred and if the accident caused death or disability, or caused disease which
resulted in death or disability, the insurer is liable.14 The courts also agree that
when the insured suffered from a disease before the accident and where the acci-
dent would have caused death or disability even if the pre-existing disease had not
been present, the insured can recover.' 5
The major difficulty, over which there has been so much controversy, is in
determining the insurer's liability when the insured dies or is disabled due to the
combined effect of pre-existing disease and accident. In such cases, there are almost
8 Burr v. Commercial Traveler's Assn., 295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E.2d 248 (1946).
9 224 N.Y. 18, 120 N.E. 56 (1918).
10 Id. at 19, 120 N.E. at 57.
11 United States Mutual Accident Assn. v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
12 152 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
13 Arnstein v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 329 Pa. 158, 196 At. 491 (1938) ; Silver-
stein v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 (1930).
14 Barnett v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 304 Mass. 564, 24 N.E.2d 662
(1939).
15 Crowder v. General Accident Assurance Corp., 180 Va. 117, 21 S.E.2d 772 (1943).
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as many approaches to the problem as there are decisions. The following cases
will serve to illustrate divergent views.
In Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,16 the insured, lifting a milk
can, slipped and fell. The can struck him in the abdomen and ruptured a small ulcer.
This rupture allowed the contents of the stomach to escape into the abdominal
cavity, which caused peritonitis and death. Before the accident, the ulcer was un-
known and was described as being the size of a pea, dormant, and not progressive.
Left to itself it would have been as harmless as a pimple or a scratch. The policy
explanation contained a provision that it was not to "cover accident, injury, dis-
ease, or death, or other loss caused wholly or partly by disease or bodily or mental
infirmity or medical or surgical treatment."'17 The court, through Justice Cardozo,
pointed out that an insurance policy "is not accepted with the thought that its
coverage is to be restricted to an Apollo or a Hercules."' 8 The court assumed that
death would not have resulted "but for" the pea-sized ulcer and allowed recovery
on the principle: 19
A distinction, then, is to be drawn between a morbid or abnormal condition of such
quality or degree that in its natural and probable development it may be expected to be
a source of mischief in which event it may be fairly described as a disease or infirmity;
and a condition abnormal or unsound when tested by a standard of perfection, yet so
remote in its potential mischief that the average man would call it not disease or in-
firmity but at the most a predisposing tendency. (Emphasis added.)
This distinction, though it may not be a simple solution in all cases, provides a
workable standard by which reasonably uniform decisions could be reached.
Courts and juries have long been disposed to allow recovery, where possible, when
disease and accident have combined.20 This principle would allow recovery even
though there is pre-existing disease, but deny recovery when pre-existing disease
has played too large a role in causing death or injury. Accident coverage may be
broadened in some cases, but it will not be wider than the average insured believes
it to be. Accident insurance companies should realize that their accident policies are
going to cover accidents as they are popularly conceived without undue regard to
the wording used in the policy. It may be possible for insurance companies to
attempt to limit their liability by the use of specifically worded exceptions, but
this has not always been successful in the past.21 The wording of the policy is not
likely to prevent recovery when pre-existing disease of a non-serious nature and
accident combine to produce death or injury.
The court rejected a literal interpretation of the policy in the Silverstein case
because it would reduce the policy and its coverage to absurdity. Combination of
two or more causes makes it impossible to point to any one cause as being efficient
to the exclusion of all others. The chain of causation can not be followed from in-
ception to conclusion as it is practically impossible to do so under a liberal inter-
pretation of the policy. For this reason the term "proximate cause," which is em-
ployed by a large number of courts,-2 tends to be misleading, although it may be
a convenient label for an efficient cause.
16 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 (1930).
17 lbid.
I1 Id. at 82, 171 N.E. at 915.
19Ibid.
20 See Stout v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 130 Cal. 471, 62 Pac. 732 (1900).
21 See note 16 supra.
22 Stokes v. Police and Firemen's Insurance Assn., 109 Ca.App.2d 928, 243 P.2d 144 (1952).
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